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Over the last year, medical error has become a prominent issue. As
policymakers and health professionals begin to address the issue, they are
turning towards reporting systems as a way of determining the magnitude
and nature of the problem. This Note provides a framework for creating
and evaluating useful reporting systems. Reporting systems are important
tools for describing the kinds of situations that result in medical error, but
high-quality reporting requires two changes: removing legal and practical
disincentives to reporting and fostering reporters' dedication to reporting.
This Note concentrates on the legal issues and ultimately proposes a
brightline rule protecting confidentiality of incident reports made for the
purposes of quality management.
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Introduction
Medical error is now a public health issue. Medical error is defined as
a preventable adverse event. An adverse event occurs when a patient
suffers injury from her medical care, rather than from her illness.' Some
adverse events are not preventable, as when a patient allergic to penicillin
receives the medication for the first time. The patient will suffer from an
unpreventable adverse event-the allergic reaction-because no one knew
or could have known that she was allergic. By contrast, any subsequent
administration of penicillin to that patient constitutes a medical error
because her allergic response is predictable, and thus preventable.
Examples of medical error include drug complications, infections that
originate in the hospital, and technical mistakes.
Although numerous studies documenting the high rate of medical
error have been published,2 the issue reached the public consciousness
when the Institute of Medicine (1OM) released its long-awaited report, To
Err Is Human.3 The piece, which contained no new information about how
often medical error occurs, quoted statistics from publications using pre-
1993 data: though most injuries are minor and temporary, 44,000 to 98,000
of the deaths that occur in hospitals every year are preventable.4 The report
received much press coverage.5 Medical professionals, policymakers, and
the general public began to discuss seriously medical error and avenues of
adequately addressing this profound problem.6
Policymakers and health professionals generally agree that medical
error is a problem, that the first step in addressing the challenge is to gain a
sense of its contours, and that reporting systems offer a useful way to
gather information. So far, their discussion has focused narrowly on the
1 COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR Is HUMAN 22
(1999) [hereinafter To ERR IS HUMAN].
2 Charles Vincent et al., Framework for Analyzing Risk and Safety in Clinical Medicine,
316 BRIT. MED. J. 1154, 1154 (1998); e.g., Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence ofAdverse Events and
Negligence in Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991); D.H. Mills, Clinical Risk
Management: Experiences from the U.S.A., in CLINICAL RISK MANAGEMENT 3 (Charles Vincent ed.,
1993).
3 TO ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 1.
4 The report cited two major studies that took place in New York and Colorado/Utah
respectively. The New York study, which used 1984 data, was published a decade ago. The
Colorado/Utah study used 1992 data and corroborated the findings in New York. These studies defined
adverse events as those that resulted in longer hospital stays, disability at discharge, or both. The
studies found that adverse events occur in about 3-4% of hospitalizations. Both studies found that
greater than 50% of adverse events were preventable. Id. at 22; Brennan, supra note 2; Lucian L.
Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 377
(1991).
5 A search of Lexis, News library, Major Newspaper file produced 80 hits. The search
included records from Nov. 30, 1999 to May 18, 2000 containing "To Err Is Human."
6 Medical Error Report Galvanizes Public, Health Care Community, AM. SOC'Y OF
HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACISTS, Dec. 14, 1999, at http://www.ashp.org/public/news/breaking/iom-
1214.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2001).
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issues of underreporting and mandatory reporting. This debate misses the
point because all reporting systems are voluntary at their core. The cost of
monitoring reporting to ensure compliance is prohibitive in a fragmented
health care system, such as ours, where errors are diffuse. Moreover, in
terms of improving patient safety, the actual number of reports is not as
important as their representativeness and quality. A strict tabulation of the
frequency of each type of error is probably not as useful as an accurate
sense of the kinds and proportionate occurrence of errors. If an error has
serious repercussions or occurs regularly, then it should be addressed.
High-quality reporting requires two changes. First, reporters' legal
and practical disincentives to reporting must be addressed. Second,
reporters need to be dedicated to the reporting system. Being committed
means that they acknowledge the important role of reporting systems in
addressing medical error.
Part I of this Note briefly lays out general strategies for addressing
medical error. Part II summarizes IOM's multi-faceted approach to
increasing patient safety. Part III focuses on IOM's second
recommendation and critiques its call for a mandatory reporting system for
serious errors. It identifies the kind of information that is useful to error
analysts and describes why a mandatory system cannot access that
information because mandatory systems do not address the legal and non-
legal contexts that help explain why providers hesitate to report. Part IV
makes suggestions about how to ease legal barriers.
I. General Strategies for Addressing Medical Error
Major strategies for enhancing patient safety generally and reducing
medical error specifically include regulation, competition, and continuous
quality improvement. All of these strategies may contribute to improving
patient safety and decreasing error. The important question is what mixture
of legal and non-legal institutions and mechanisms will achieve an optimal
level of patient safety.7 Many have commented on the strengths and
7 This is a question of comparative institutional analysis:
Safety is a goal choice; tort liability is a law or public policy choice. No goal
choice standing on its own dictates law or public policy choices. The goal of
safety is consistent with a wide variety of law and public policy choices.... Put
in institutional terms, depending on the setting, optimal safety might be achieved
by tort liability through the adjudicative process, by regulation through the
political process, or by transactions through the market process. The link
between goals and law and public policy results is institutional choice.
Larry I. Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction, and the Law, 36 HouS. L. REv. 1609, 1619 (1999)
(quoting Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and
Public Policy 155 (1994)).
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weaknesses of each strategy, which I review briefly below before
recapping IOM's multi-faceted approach.8
First, traditional regulation, such as accreditation and licensure,
exhibits several shortcomings with regard to quality improvement. These
shortcomings include inadequate flexibility and protracted modification
procedures, which inhibit timely responses to rapidly changing health care
delivery systems and markets. 9 Moreover, regulation has traditionally
focused on processes-inspecting documentation, credentialing
procedures, and the work of oversight committees in hospitals-rather
than outcomes.10 Regulation assures a minimum level of quality by
delineating and enforcing a floor on acceptable performance,11 even if it
does not improve directly the health outcomes of patients."2
Second, the health care market has not traditionally placed pressure
on providers to improve quality. The market focuses on price because
quality is difficult to measure and health care consumers often do not have
sufficient information to make informed buying decisions. Theoretically, if
the public had good data about quality and could discriminate among
health care providers based on that information, providers would compete
by enhancing quality.1 3 Currently, practical obstacles stand in the way of
8 E.g., TROYEN A. BRENNAN & DONALD M. BERWICK, NEW RULES: REGULATION,
MARKETS, AND THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (1996); Mark R. Chassin, Assessing
Strategies for Quality Improvement, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May-June 1997, at 151.
9 Chassin, supra note 8, at 154. See generally BRENNAN & BERWICK, supra note 8
(examining the relationship between health care regulation and quality).
10 BRENNAN & BERWICK, supra note 8, at 1-2. The authors consider traditional regulatory
measures, such as hospital accreditation, to be a "meaningless waste of resources." Id at 3. The Joint
Commission for Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) accredits hospitals. JCAHO has
traditionally focused on structural measures of quality assurance. With respect to nosocomial
infections (that is, infections originating in the hospital), for example, JCAHO honed in on the minutes
from hospital epidemiologists' meetings. It ignored how often nosocomial infections actually occur or
how a hospital's infection rate compares with its competitors. Id. at 2-3. The authors quote a hospital
administrator: "What good . . . was regulation if the regulators ignored our quality improvement
efforts?" Id. at 2.
11 Chassin, supra note 8, at 154-55. But see Quality Management in Health Care Systems:
Hearings on Quality Management in the Veteran 's Health Administration Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 104th Cong. (1998) (statement of Molla S.
Donaldson, Project Director, National Roundtable on Health Care Quality, Institute of Medicine), 1998
WL 169663, at para. 33.
12 Mark R. Chassin, Quality of Health Care. Part 3: Improving the Quality of Care, 335
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1060 (1996).
13 But see Duncan Moore Jr., Protocols Reduce Errors in Washington Heart Program,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 14, 2000, at 69. Moore describes Sacred Heart Medical Center's heart
transplant program, a small program that ranks among the best. The program works because it is
committed to patient safety: it builds in redundancy (for example, two people must confirm a blood
type before transfusion), the transplant team regularly discusses whether processes should be modified
to improve safety, and the two program directors review every physician decision. Even with the
redundancy, transplants at Sacred Heart cost only half the national average. The program director
attributes the savings to Sacred Heart's emphasis on safety, which helps to avoid unnecessary mistakes
and complications. Despite Sacred Heart's track record, the program is shrinking. The director, John
Iconegle, sighs, "Nobody really looks at quality data." Id.
Promoting Patient Safety: Creating a Workable Reporting System
testing this theory. These obstacles include getting health care providers to
create accurate data about quality, getting access to that data, and
distributing the data to the public before it is obsolete.
14
Even if such obstacles could be overcome, Mark Chassin, former
New York State Health Commissioner and a member of the panel that
wrote the IOM report, asks how the process of making a market for quality
would work. Assuming 100 excellent measures of quality, the chance of
any institution scoring at the top for each measure is small. How then
would a consumer with more than one health issue choose among
hospitals? Chassin doubts that patient-consumers would select providers
using quality measures, especially given the fact that rankings would most
likely change from year to year.15 Substantial barriers prohibit health
plans, like individuals, from responding to quality information effectively.
Even supposing that they could tailor their networks to include the best
hospitals, changing networks in response to shifting quality data disrupts
health care systems 16 and may interfere with doctor-patient relationships,
which may by itself adversely affect quality.
However, health care providers have an incentive to improve quality
even if doing so will not affect their market share. Increased quality means
lower costs. Organizations that enhance the quality of production
processes can save money by reducing delays, duplicative or unnecessary
services, and the costs associated with correcting or ameliorating errors. 7
For example, anesthesiologists' greater than 95% reduction of mortal error
over the last three decades shows how powerfully markets can affect the
drive toward patient safety.'"
14 Chassin, supra note 8, at 156. For example, current programs in New York and
Pennsylvania collect quality data on Coronary Artery Bypass Graft and publish when the data is two
years old. 1d. at 157.
15 Id. (noting that quality data will change even if it is only because of the random variation
inherent in any measurement). Anyone who follows the US. News & World Report rankings of
colleges and graduate schools has witnessed this phenomenon. But see Barry R. Furrow, The Problem
of Medical Error: The Institution as Toxin, HEALTH L. NEWS, Mar. 2000, at 5, 13 (noting that as
patients become more sophisticated, they are able to process outcomes data about medical treatments
and choose their providers and institutions accordingly).
16 Chassin, supra note 8, at 157.
17 George W. Whetsell, Total Quality Management, in QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 79
(Nancy 0. Graham ed., 1995).
18 Larry I. Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction and the Law, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1609,
1624-25 (1999). Anesthesiology's record of progress in patient safety is an example of the market at
work. In the 1970s and 1980s, insurance premiums for high-risk specialties, including anesthesiology,
skyrocketed. David M. Gaba, Anaesthesiology as a Modelfor Patient Safety in Health Care, 320 BRIT.
MED. J. 785, 785 (2000). Faced with increasingly exorbitant insurance costs, anesthesiologists
confronted issues of patient safety head on and achieved dramatic results. In the 1950s, one in 3000 to
4000 patients died from anesthesia. In the 1970s, the number shrank to one death per 10,000 patients
receiving anesthesia. By the 1990s, the number further decreased to one death in 200,000 to 300,000
anesthetic administrations. Anesthesiology is now widely acknowledged as the leading medical
specialty in terms of addressing patient safety. See, e.g., id.; Jan Ziegler, A Medical Specialty Blazes a
Trail, in REDUCING MEDICAL ERRORS AND IMPROVING PATIENT SAFETY 26 (Nat'l Coalition on Health
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Third, Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) is a relatively recent
addition to the repertoire of tools for improving patient safety.' 9 Imported
from the industrial setting, CQI focuses on the cause of adverse events
from a "systems" perspective and asks about the context or conditions that
led to the error. Instead of blaming the easiest to identify and the last link
in the error chain (the practitioner who made the mistake), CQI asks why
the practitioner made the mistake. CQI assumes that error is not the result
of negligence or lack of skill. It focuses on modifying the health care
context in order to make errors less likely.2
CQI's use of systems analysis demonstrates the complexity of the
21chain of events that may lead to an adverse event. James Reason, a social
psychologist and CQI expert, distinguishes between active and latent
failures in order to make plain that an error results when a series of events
coalesce in an unfortunate way.2 He calls those errors committed by
frontline practitioners (physicians, nurses, pharmacists, etc) active failures.
These are mistakes that can result from, for example, a lapse in attention
when the practitioner is particularly fatigued or busy.23 Latent failures are
the "delayed action consequences" of decisions that are removed from, but
nevertheless mold the context where active failures will take place.24 These
include choices about protocols, the structure of the organization,
allocation of resources, the number of employees, training and
organization, the length of shift, and so forth.2 5 Latent failures are summed
up by the phrase "disaster waiting to happen." Sometimes, frontline
practitioners know about latent failures before accidents happen. 6 Other
times, latent failures become apparent only when they combine with active
failures.27 Reason believes that to deal with error efficiently, the health
care system should focus on latent errors, which, once recognized, can be
tackled systematically. In contrast, active failures, by their very nature, are
difficult to predict in advance.
28
Care ed., 2000). In their drive towards increased safety and away from high malpractice premiums,
anesthesiologists orchestrated their safety revolution with the help of engineers knowledgeable in
industrial safety techniques, equipment manufacturers, and nurses. Ziegler, supra, at 27.
19 Cf Chassin, supra note 8, at 157-58 (discussing CQI as a "third major strategy" for
improving quality of care).
20 Donald M. Berwick, Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Health Care, 320 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 53 (1989).
21 Vincent et al., supra note 2, at 1154.





26 E.g., Carol Ukens, Deadly Dispensing: An Exclusive Survey of Rx Errors by Pharmacists
141 DRUG TOPICs 100 (1997) (stating that pharmacists know they commit drug dispensing errors
because they need "more time, more techs, and more tranquility behind the counter").
27 Reason, supra note 22, at xii.
28 Anesthesiology's innovations provide some concrete examples of CQI at work. Oxygen
Vol. 18:383, 2001
Promoting Patient Safety: Creating a Workable Reporting System
As we have seen, regulation, the market, and CQI are all potentially
viable approaches to improving patient safety by reducing medical error.
The question is what blend of these approaches will improve patient
safety. In hypothesizing about the correct mix, IOM made a series of
recommendations that touched all three, but particularly embraced CQI.
29
II. IOM's Recommendations for Improving Quality
In its report, IOM recommended a "comprehensive approach" which
balances regulation with market incentives. 30  Through monitoring,
regulation ensures a minimum level of safety by identifying problems and
taking corrective action. Market incentives can direct the priorities of a
health care organization by rewarding institutions that perform beyond the
standards set by regulatory agencies. Marketplace inducements include not
only economic motivation such as group and individual purchasing
activities, but professional norms and values, as well as social demands.?
The IOM committee believed that "[c]areful alignment of regulatory,
deprivation of anesthetized patients used to be one of the most common problems in anesthesia. This
occurred when anesthesiologists accidentally put the oxygen tube into the esophagus (which leads to
the stomach) instead of the trachea (which leads to the lungs). This blunder can lead quickly to
suffocation, brain damage, and death. The anesthesiologist's technical gaffe is an example of an active
error. The nonexistence of equipment designed to wam an anesthesiologist when her patient was about
to suffer permanent injury from oxygen deficiency can be characterized as a latent error. Ultimately,
the introduction of the pulse-oxymeter, a device that reads the amount of oxygen in the patient's
bloodstream, eliminated the occurrence of oxygen deprivation due to misplaced tubes. Although
anesthesiologists still sometimes insert oxygen tubes into the esophagus, the pulse-oxymeter allows
them to catch their mistake before harm occurs.
For another example, the anesthesiologist's job has been described as long intervals of boredom
punctuated with moments of heart-rending terror. Anesthesiologists watching a typical and, from their
point of view, boring surgery commonly find that their attention drifts. The result is that they are not
prepared for the moments when the patient spirals into crisis. Once anesthesiologists began to
acknowledge and accept that humans typically do not keep up their vigilance for hours at a time, they
corroborated with equipment manufacturers to design inattentiveness into the system. They adjusted
medical equipment so that when the patient's vital signs wander from the acceptable range, a beep
calls the anesthesiologist back to attention so that he can appropriately address the situation. Ziegler,
supra note 18, at 27-28.
29 To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 1, at 42. Chapter 3, entitled "Why Do Errors Happen,"
explicitly embraces the systems approach put forth in CQI:
The common initial reaction when an error occurs is to find and blame someone.
However, even apparently single events or errors are due most often to the
convergence of multiple contributing factors. Blaming an individual does not
change these factors and the same error is likely to recur. Preventing errors and
improving safety for patients requires a systems approach in order to modify the
conditions that contribute to errors. People working in health care are among the
most educated and dedicated workforce in any industry. The problem is not bad
people; the problem is that the system needs to be made safer.
Id.
30 Id. at 15, 18.
31 Id. at 17.
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economic, professional and other incentives in the external environment is
critical if significant improvements in safety is to occur.' '32 Though IOM
sought to carefully balance the incentive structure, it acknowledged that
the proper equilibrium is unknown.
IOM made four proposals. The first was the creation of a "Center for
Patient Safety," which would articulate nationwide safety targets, verify
advancement towards those targets, and issue annually a report about
patient safety to Congress and the President.33 The idea behind the Center
is to focus attention on the important social goal of increasing patient
safety and to evaluate whether the health care system is moving towards
that goal. The second proposal was the establishment of nationwide
reporting system for injuries that lead to serious adverse events. Although
many states already have collecting systems in place, they vary widely as
to what constitutes a reportable event and the information collected; a
number of these states do not analyze their databases to identify trends. A
nationwide system would homogenize information-gathering which would
allow for data aggregation and analysis. The reason behind limiting
obligatory reports to serious errors is that such errors are difficult to hide.34
The third proposal suggested that public and private entities can encourage
health care organizations to improve their safety records. Regulators would
require that health care organizations create programs that advance patient
safety within their organizations. Purchasers of group plans (i.e.
employers) could make safety concerns an issue when contracting with
health care organizations and by disseminating safety information to their
employees.35 Finally, the fourth proposal was the development of a
"culture of safety' 36 in health care organizations, which would include
"respect[ing] human limits in process design." 37
III. Mandatory Reporting Systems and The Surrounding Debate
Part III focuses on IOM's second recommendation concerning
reporting systems. Such systems and the data they generate are at the core
of any workable CQI program. The most important question is how to
design a system that encourages reporting. While general agreement exists
that voluntary systems are a good idea, people are deeply divided about
whether mandatory systems will encourage better and more reporting.
38
32 Id. at 18.
33 Id. at 59.
34 Id. at 76.
35 Id. at 115-16.
36 Id. at 135.
37 Id. at 136.
38 E.g., Robert Pear, Clinton To Order Steps To Reduce Medical Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Clinton to Order Steps] (stating that the "[m]ost controversial
Vol. 18:383, 2001
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Advocates of mandatory reporting believe that practitioners won't
report unless forced. They say that health care professionals have ignored
egregious errors for years and ask why the public should now trust these
professionals to start combating error. They demand mandatory systems to
ensure accountability.39 They believe that once mandatory systems collect
and disperse information, a market for quality will force health care
providers to devote resources to patient safety.
In contrast, representatives of individual and institutional providers
speak out against mandatory reporting systems. They typically say that
mandatory reporting systems will not improve, and may even harm, the
patient safety movement. For example, Nancy W. Dickey, former
president of the American Medical Association, said, "We are opposed to
mandatory reporting. It may well drive underground the very information
you need to improve safety. A number of states have mandatory reporting,
and there's no evidence that they have greater or fewer errors. ' '40 Richard
Davidson, president of the American Hospital Association echoed, "The
idea that a mandatory reporting system is going to change behavior is
naive at best. You need to focus on making a cultural change in hospitals,
to promote open discussion of errors, and that's not possible if some
plaintiffs attorney is climbing on your back."''  Similarly, Stanton
Smullens, a spokesman for the AHA, said, "We have to create an
environment in which we learn from failure. This cannot be achieved in an
environment of punishment or fear of legal prosecution for doctors, nurses
and other caregivers who step forward after an unfortunate mistake is
made. 42
These statements underscore some common themes in the debate
about reporting systems. Health officials, research experts, and
professional associations generally agree that the first step in reducing
error is to collect information so that we understand the problem, and
further, they concur that reporting systems can adequately gather the
necessary data. At the same time, they concede that underreporting is a
element of the President's plan is his support for mandatory reporting to the states of all medical errors
that cause serious injury or death"); see also Andrea Gerlin, Philadelphia 's Largest Hospitals Failed to
Report Medical Errors, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 22, 2000, at Al; Julie Rovner, Washington Wakes up to
Medical Mistakes, BUS. & HEALTH, Jan. 1, 2000, at 19 (calling the issue of mandatory reporting
"problematic": "While most provider groups were quick to rally around the panel's call for a voluntary
and confidential reporting system for 'near misses,' mandatory reporting of serious mistakes of state
officials remains a problem").
39 E.g., Joint Hearing on Medical Errors: Improving Quality of Care and Consumer
Information Before the Subcomm. on Health & Env 't and the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations
of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Daniel Perry, Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Foundation for Accountability), 2000 WL 145874.
40 Clinton To Order Steps, supra note 38.
41 Id.
42 Medical Errors: AMA Not in Favor of Mandatory Reporting, AM. HEALTH LINE, Dec.
14, 1999, LEXIS, Medical News & Info. Library, Am. Health Line File.
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problem.43 Patient advocates have looked to mandatory reporting as the
solution to underreporting. Health care providers do not believe that
obligatory reports are the answer, and they suggest that the best way to
encourage reporting is to remove legal disincentives.44
The rationale behind mandatory systems is misguided for two
reasons. First, empirical evidence shows that providers do not report, even
when they are obligated to do so. Second, even when they do report,
mandatory systems are unlikely to create a reporting context that would
elicit information likely to reduce future errors. In fact, the current system
disincents providers from providing the very information that is most
helpful in reducing patient risk.
A. Mandatory Reporting Systems
The primary purpose of mandatory reporting systems is to "hold
providers accountable" for errors.45 Typically, state regulatory programs
run mandatory reporting systems and have the authority to investigate,
penalize, and fine individuals for wrongdoing.46 Mandatory systems
guarantee some level of patient safety because they respond to the most
serious errors and provide an incentive to health care organizations to
avoid errors in order to evade censure and potential public exposure.
Mandatory reporting systems can be public or confidential. In its
proposal for a mandatory reporting system, IOM gave two reasons why the
public should be able to access the results of analysis for individual cases.
First, patients should know the risks they will encounter when receiving
medical care. Second, once consumers understand the risks they face, they
will demand improvement and health care organizations will be forced to
invest in patient safety.47
In essence, the purpose of making the information available is to
create a floor for quality. I use the term "floor" because mandatory
systems only collect data about events that result in serious disability or
death. As such, mandatory systems will force health care organizations
fearful of a reputation for extremely poor quality to make some
investments in patient safety. The theory that a non-confidential mandatory
system will improve quality by making providers accountable depends on
43 E.g., To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 1, at 79; Clinton To Order Steps, supra note 38;
Robert Pear, U.S. Health Officials Reject Plan to Report Medical Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23. 2000,
at Al 4 [hereinafter Health Officials Reject Plan].
44 Health Officials Reject Plan, supra note 43.
45 TO ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 1, at 74.
46 Currently, at least one third of states have mandatory reporting systems. However, the
states generally do not analyze the data for trends because they lack good data and they do not have the
resources for analysis. Id. at 78.
47 Id. at 88.
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a number of assumptions: (1) providers will report; (2) the mandatory
nature of the system can be enforced; (3) that information will be timely
and in a form that consumers can use; (4) consumers will use it; and (5)
health care organizations will respond by improving quality.
The first and most fundamental factor is whether providers will report
to the mandatory system. Professional organizations have protested
vehemently against such systems. Presumably, the reason why reporting
systems focused on accountability have to be mandatory is that
practitioners will protect themselves unless they are forced to report. But,
empirically, providers don't report to mandatory systems. At least a third
of states had mandatory systems in place at the time of the IOM report.
Despite their "mandatory" nature, "underreporting . . . plague[d] all
programs. ' '4
For example, in Pennsylvania, which requires reports for gross events
such as deaths due to injuries, suicide or malnutrition,49 the Department of
Health received only one report for the one-year period that ended in June
1999.50 Philadelphia's hospitals alone probably encountered thousands of
reportable errors." The story in Pennsylvania is not unique. North
Carolina's mandatory reporting system received 15 reports in its first year
and Colorado received 17 reports in two years.52
How do hospitals get away with failing to report? In Pennsylvania,
the Department of Health does not enforce the regulation. According to the
Department's spokeswoman, the law "doesn't provide for us to go out and
see what's taking place. ' 3 Even if the Department had the authority and
the desire to investigate, how would it? The costs of monitoring providers
to make sure they report would be prohibitively expensive. Medical errors
48 Id. at 79.
49 Pennsylvania defines a reportable event as:
an event that seriously compromises quality assurance or patient safety,
including: deaths due to injuries, suicide, or unusual circumstances; deaths due
to medication error; deaths due to malnutrition, dehydration, or sepsis;
elopements; patient abuse; rape; surgery on the wrong patient or modality;
hemolytic transfusion reaction; infant abduction or discharge to wrong family;
fire or structural damage; unlicensed practice of a regulated profession.
Id. app. E, at 214.
50 Gerlin, supra note 38, at Al.
51 Id.
52 Charles Billings, Incident Reporting Systems in Medicine and Experience with the
Aviation Safety Reporting System, in A TALE OF Two STORIES: CONTRASTING VIEWS OF PATIENT
SAFETY app. B, at 55 (1998). As in Pennsylvania, reportable events in Colorado are not inconspicuous:
"All deaths from unexplained causes or under suspicious circumstances. Brain and spinal cord injuries.
Life-threatening complications of anesthesia. Life-threatening transfusion errors or reactions. Bums;
missing persons; physical, sexual and verbal abuse; neglect, misappropriation of property; diverted
drugs; malfunction or misuse of equipment." TO ERR Is HUMAN, supra note I app. D, at 211.
53 Gerlin, supra note 38, at Al (quoting Amy Riegelman).
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are dispersed throughout a fragmented system that consists of thousands of
practitioners scattered among hundreds of institutions. The costs of
monitoring such a diffuse system would be too costly.
Given that state health departments cannot enforce reporting
directives, adequately addressing the problem of underreporting requires
making sure that potential reporters are devoted to the reporting system.
Providers understandably hesitate to report adverse events to a system that
will hold them accountable, and as a result, their compliance efforts are
minimal. For example, the Philadelphia hospitals claim their failure to
report is a result of their being perplexed about the regulations. 54 This
somewhat feeble excuse underscores Charles Billings' contention that
ultimately, all reporting systems are voluntary.
[I]n some form, in one way or another, all incident reporting becomes
voluntary. It either becomes voluntary because of inertia on the part of
reporters, or it becomes voluntary because of constraints within the
establishment and the environment, or it becomes voluntary because
hospitals decide that they are not required to report this particular event
because of the fine print in that particular incident reporting regulation or
statute.5
Thus, I suggest that increased reporting will not be achieved through
a mandatory reporting system because whether practitioners report does
not turn on the mandatory or voluntary nature of the system, but rather on
whether the reporters feel comfortable reporting.
Arguably, the ultimate goal of any system should be to increase
patient safety by reducing medical error. In a sense, mandatory systems
attempt to ensure accountability in order to improve safety. Holding
providers accountable for lapses in patient safety will encourage them to
invest resources in avoiding error. However, empirical evidence shows
that providers simply do not report to punitive systems. Thus, mandatory
systems are at odds with the goal of increasing patient safety. If the
primary goal is safety, the first step is to establish a mechanism to find out
the extent of the medical error problem. One answer to this information
conundrum is well-planned, thoughtfully-designed reporting systems that
encourage reporting. 56 The key to a good design is (1) to determine what
54 Id.
55 Billings, supra note 52, at 55.
56 E.g., Neil M. Davis, Nonpunitive Medication Error Reporting Systems: Tough to Accept
but Safest for Patients, 31 HosP. PHARMACY 1036 (1996). Davis writes:
In the long run, what is in the best interest of patient safety, to punish and inhibit
the reporting of errors, or to encourage error reporting in a nonpunitive system
and let individuals go unpunished for making errors? Although I say "going
unpunished," this is actually a misnomer, because there is always self-
punishment. In my opinion, the benefits of increased error reporting far
outweigh the benefits achieved by punishment .... [fin the long run, . . . it is
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kind of information you need and (2) to identify and remove disincentives
to reporting that information. The next parts discuss each of these factors
in turn.
B. The Information a Reporting System Should Collect
If reducing medical error is "fundamentally an information
problem,, 57 what kind of information is required to reduce medical error?
An ideal report contains a recounting of the facts, the provider's mental
impressions, her opinion about why the error happened, and any
recommendations for reform.58 The last two components are crucial.
Practitioners offer the best information about why a mistake happened. For
example, if a pharmacist mixes up two drugs, the pharmacist knows if she
made the mistake because she was fatigued, she failed to check the
technician's output, she couldn't read the physician's handwriting, or she
confused the prescribed medication with a similarly-named drug. The
reporters' perceptions seem crucial to any analysis about why an error
occurred. As such, the reporting format of any successful system should
reserve a central space for their insights.
Error analysts emphasize the importance of capturing a vivid and
textured narrative of what happened in a particular case. The story is the
key piece of data. Researchers can then search and research the database of
descriptions using many schemes of classification. In other words, they
can group and regroup the narratives in an attempt to find new
connections, patterns, trends, and contrasts. Rich detail is especially
important in complex situations where there may be many reasons for
safer to know what is going on, so that you can attempt to fix it, than to punish
employees for making errors.
Id. Taking a systems perspective, as IOM does, requires the recognition that from a frontline provider's
vantage point, the difference between active failures that result in a serious injury and those that result
in a "near miss" is quite small. As such, IOM was quite tom about whether to hold on to
accountability. The following quotation displays that tension:
[E]vents that are reported inside health care organizations or to voluntary
systems should be protected because they often focus on lesser injuries or non-
injurious events that have the potential to cause serious harm to patients, but
have not produced a serious adverse event that requires reporting to the
mandatory system.
To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 1, at 95 (emphasis added).
57 Hearing on Medical Errors Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Ways and
Means Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Hearing on Medical Errors] (statement of Dennis
O'Leary, President of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations), 2000 WL
156288, at para. 10.
58 Cynthia J. Dollar, Promoting Better Health Care: Policy Arguments for Concurrent
Quality Assurance and Attorney-Client Hospital Incident Report Privileges, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 259,
290 (1993).
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error.5 9 This honest and probing recollection of how an error occurred
cannot be coerced by a standardized and obligatory form. The potentially
damning detail that error analysts require is important to consider when
trying to identify and remove disincentives to reporting.
C. Identifying Disincentives to Reporting
The number of studies investigating the problem of underreporting is
small and their sample sizes are smaller. Nevertheless, they provide a
starting point for thinking about impediments to reporting: (1) fear of
litigation and (2) extra-legal barriers, such as lack of education about
quality improvement and deficient awareness or access to the incident
reporting system.
1. Fear Of Litigation And The Current Legal Landscape
Fear of liability is often cited as an explanation for practitioners'
failure to report.60 Adequately addressing providers' fears requires not
only protecting the confidentiality of incident reports, but attending to
providers' often erroneous perceptions about the law.6' Physicians do not
know much about the law, but what little they do know scares and angers
them. They believe that the tort system aggressively punishes medical
errors. 6 2 They almost uniformly agree that the tort system drives them to
59 NAT'L HEALTH CARE SAFETY COUNCIL, AMA, A TALE OF Two STORIES:
CONTRASTING VIEWS OF PATIENT SAFETY 45 (1998).
60 E.g., Hearing on Medical Errors, supra note 57 (commenting that the "fear of litigation
is a significant impediment [to reporting] for the majority of health care providers"); David J. Cullen et
al., The Incident Reporting System Does Not Detect Adverse Drug Events, 21 JT. COMM'N J. QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT 541, 547 (1995); Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Error Versus Malpractice, I DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 751, 765 (1997) [hereinafter Kapp, Medical Error] ("[P]hysicians' legal anxieties
serve as a powerful barrier to the implementation of a concerted strategy to identify, prevent, mitigate,
and correct those errors."); Brian A. Liang, The Legal System and Patient Safety: Charting a Divergent
Course : : The Relationship between Malpractice Litigation and Human Errors, 91 ANESTHESIOLOGY
609, 610 (1999) (arguing that potential discovery of information in tort suits "chill[s]" reporting of
medical error); J. Bryan Sexton et al., Error, Stress, and Teamwork in Medicine and Aviation: Cross
Sectional Survey, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 745, 747 (2000) (reporting that 71% of 1033 practitioner
participants find it difficult to acknowledge mistakes because of the threat of malpractice suits).
61 MARSHALL B. KAPP, OUR HANDS ARE TIED 12-20 (1998) [hereinafter KAPP, OUR
HANDS]. Physicians get their legal information from a panoply of sources, including and especially
"folklore, anecdotes, and stereotypes." Id. Physicians tend to "grossly overestimate" their risk of being
sued and this is partly because horror stories get repeated again and again. Id. Interestingly, a very non-
scientific web-based opinion survey found that 85% of responding healthcare professionals believed
that the government could not protect the confidentiality of those making errors. Health Care
Professionals Overwhelmingly Fear Mandatory Reporting of Medical Errors, Bus. WIRE, Mar. 22,
2000, LEXIS, News Library, Bus. Wire File.
62 Nathaniel Hupert et al., Processing the Tort Deterrent Signal.: A Qualitative Study, 43
SOC. SCI. MED. 1 (1996) (arguing that what matters is not what the tort system does, but how
physicians perceive or "process" the lessons of malpractice cases). Their perceptions are not backed by
fact. In a study of malpractice claims, researchers found that the severity of the patient's disability is
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hide errors in an effort to avoid suits because they suffer when they are
sued.63 Physicians tend not to distinguish professional from personal
competency, so they tend to see lawsuits as attacks on their personal
being.64
Physicians' exaggerated perceptions of legal liability are due, in part,
to the fact that they do not understand the law, and in part to the fact that
the current legal landscape is a muddle with respect to knowing ex ante
whether an incident report can be discovered. Potential reporters often do
not know before they report whether a plaintiffs attorney will be able to
use the report when suing the reporter.
Currently, hospital incident reports are generally discoverable.
Hospitals have tried to use three federal rules of evidence or state medical
peer review statutes to protect incident reports from plaintiffs' attorneys
with varying, but mostly limited, success. I will discuss the remedial action
rule, the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, and state
medical peer review statutes in turn.
a. Remedial Action Rule
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 codifies the remedial action privilege:
"When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are
taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence [or] culpable conduct . ... 65The public policy behind
the rule is to encourage--or at least greatly diminish disincentives for-
subsequent repairs. In the rule's absence, defendants might hesitate to
make corrections for fear that such actions would be viewed by a jury as
an admission of guilt. As stated, the privilege does not extend to hospital
incident reports because the reports themselves are not remedial
the best predictor of a malpractice award. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent
Adverse Events and the Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1963
(1996). In other words, juries will sometimes find against innocent physicians and sometimes find for
negligent ones, depending on the nature of the patient's outcome.
63 KAPP, OUR HANDS, supra note 61, at 9 ("A lawsuit is particularly and uniquely offensive
to physicians, and the vehemence of their negative reaction to the experience far exceeds that of any
other kind of professional defendant."); Hupert, supra note 62, at I (finding that respondents to a
questionnaire largely define medical negligence in terms of the moral qualities of the practitioner);
Kapp, Medical Error, supra note 60, at 755-56 (quoting a physician as saying, "[U]pon being served
with a summons, the initial reaction is one of benumbed disbelief followed by self-deprecating
analysis, schooled as the physician is in the pursuit of excellence, then feelings of inadequacy, and,
finally, anger, frustration, and a tremendous sense of isolation").
Many commentators have noted that not talking to patients about errors is not good risk
reduction. Patients are less likely to sue when their doctors admit their errors. E.g., John D. Lantos,
Should Doctors Tell the Truth?, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 1997, at C12.
64 KAPP, OUR HANDS, supra note 61, at 9.
65 FED. R. EVID. 407.
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measures.
66
However, a cogent argument exists for extending the privilege to
incident reports produced for quality improvement purposes.67 Incident
reports are an essential first step to making reparations. The policy
rationale for the extension is that the public's interest in improving quality
in health care will be compromised if incident reports are available to
plaintiffs' attorneys. Reporters may hesitate to disclose all material facts if
the evidence implicates them or their superiors.68 Some states have
extended the remedial action privilege to incident reports, but many have
not.69
b. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is absolute and protects the
communications between a client and her attorney.7 ° The privilege extends
to an incident report only if three conditions are met. First, the attorney
and the reporter must contemplate the existence of an attorney-client
privilege. Second, the reporter must seek advice from the attorney in his
capacity as a legal advisor. Finally, the communication between the
attorney and the reporter must remain confidential.71 The privilege extends
to reports where the primary purpose is to inform the hospital's attorney or
liability insurer about an event that could lead to litigation. Although
hospitals frequently invoke this argument when they do not want to turn
over their incident reports, the privilege does not extend comfortably to
routine incident reports made for quality improvement measures. In West
Virginia ex rel. United Hospital Center, Inc. v. Bedell, for example, the
court held that a nurse's incident report was not protected by attorney-
client privilege. In making its determination, the court noted that the
hospital failed to show that the nurse had contemplated an attorney-client
relationship or had sought advice from the hospital attorney when she
66 Dollar, supra note 58, at 284-85.
67 Id. at 284.
68 Id. at 285.
69 To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1, at 101.
70 Of note is that the privilege extends only to communications, not to facts. "A fact is one
thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different thing. The client cannot be
compelled to answer the question, "What did you say or write to the attorney?" but may not refuse to
disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such
fact into his communication to his attorney." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96
(1981) (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
Currently, most incident reports contain only statements of fact. Although, as I have suggested earlier
in this Note, incident reports need to contain much more if they are to be effective. See supra Section
III.B.
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prepared the incident report.72 Rather the nurse filled out the report in the
ordinary course of her work. The nurse testified that she filed a report "any
time there's any kind of incident, not necessarily an injury, but anything
that's out of the ordinary." 73 She was simply following the hospital's
guidelines for filling out incident reports for the express purpose of
enhancing care and providing a safe environment. 74 In terms of reporting
for quality improvement purposes, the nurse was doing exactly what we
want her to do. However, the narrow attorney-client privilege does not
cover this situation.
c. Work Product Doctrine
The third federal rule that hospitals invoke to protect incident reports
is the attorney work product doctrine. The work product doctrine is a
qualified privilege, which protects any material that an attorney produces
in preparation for possible litigation.75 The doctrine does not grant an
absolute privilege, so the party requesting discovery may gain access to
factual work product materials if he shows substantial need. Where the
work product is opinion, the court will not allow discovery.7 6 Whether a
particular report falls within the scope of the work product doctrine
depends on a factual determination of whether the hospital produced the
report in anticipation of litigation or in the ordinary course of business.
The work product does not readily apply to CQI incident reports, which
are generated in the ordinary course of business and handed over to the
reporting system or the hospital's internal quality improvement team.
For example, in United Hospital Center, Inc., the hospital's
guidelines promulgated reporting for the purposes of patient safety and
implored all people associated with the hospital to report any unusual
incidents. The court held that the work product privilege applied where the
primary purpose behind a report's production was to prepare for
litigation.77 In this case, the court determined that the incident report
72 Id.
73 Id. at 205.
74 Id. at 204-05.
75 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1974). The privilege is codified in FED. R. CIv. P.
26(b)(3).
76 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 495.
77 United Hosp. Cr.. Inc., 484 S.E.2d at 213. The court notes that although the majority of
courts take a similar approach, at least one jurisdiction has construed the privilege more narrowly. Id.
at 212. The court reproduces the following quotation from Stout v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 150
F.R.D. 594 (S.D. Ind. 1993), affd, 852 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ind. 1994):
If a document or thing would have been created for non-litigation uses
regardless of its intended use in litigation preparation, it should not be accorded
work product protection. Because the document would have been created for
non-litigation reasons anyway, disclosure of the information therein would not
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addressed quality as well as claims management. This court is not unusual
in its determination that reports produced for the purposes of risk
management and quality improvement are not protected under the work
product privilege.78
d. Medical Peer Review Statutes
Most states have a statute granting a peer review privilege. Peer
review is a retrospective process whereby standard procedures and the care
provided by particular health care providers are subject to scrutiny by
other health care professionals. The purpose is to elevate the standard of
care by learning from mistakes, thereby reducing error. If the system
works optimally, participants will produce documents and critical analyses
of the care rendered. These statutes generally give immunity to good-faith
participants in the peer-review process and protect the "proceedings" and
"records" of the review committee from discovery or admission to trial.79
Legislatures grant these protections in order to encourage health care
providers to speak candidly and thereby improve health care quality. If
these safeguards were not available, participants might hesitate to speak
openly if they thought that their comments and conjectures would become
the basis for a case against one of their colleagues.
In trying to balance the anxieties of peer reviewers and the discovery
needs of plaintiffs, many courts construe "proceedings" and "records"
narrowly and limit the privilege to the committee's formal proceedings and
internal records.8° In other words, unless a formal committee created or
directed the creation of the document, the privilege does not apply.
Incident reports, which are generally filled out by staff members as part of
their employment, do not fall within the narrow reading of the privilege.
These courts allow discovery of incident reports because they do not want
to give hospitals a way to hide incriminating information by funneling it
through peer review committees. 8' Other courts grant peer review privilege
to incident reports because they recognize that these reports, like peer
disadvantage its creator, or advantage hiss opponent, by revealing the creator's
legal strategy or tactics; thus the document's release in discovery would not
contravene the policies supporting the work product rule.
United Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 484 S.E.2d at n. 18.
78 E.g., Cochran v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 909 F. Supp. 641, 645 (W.D. Ark.
1995); Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. v. Eighth J. Dist. Ct,, 936 P.2d 844, 848 (Nev. 1997). But see
Enke v. Anderson, 733 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
79 Charles David Creech, Comment, The Medical Review Committee Privilege: A
Jurisdictional Survey, 67 N.C. L. REV. 179, 180 (1988); e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-46-105 (Michie
2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 111, § 204(a) (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. 49.265 (2001).
80 See Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 936 P.2d at 848-49 (reviewing several state
courts' -Arizona, Nevada, North Dakota, Texas, and Illinois-narrow constructions of the privilege).
81 See, e.g., May v. Wood River Township Hosp., 629 N.E.2d 170, 174 (III. App. Ct. 1994).
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review committees, play a crucial role in improving health care quality.
82
Courts that extend the privilege to incident reports assume that the
participants in the process are committed to patient safety. However,
problems may occur if the reviewers are not devoted foremost to patient
well-being. The confidentiality of the documents means that in practice,
the committee may ignore egregious infractions precisely because it knows
that the data is confidential. In other words, the peer review privilege may
protect peer review boards that do not do their jobs. For example, in
Glickman v. South Park Medical Center Inc.," the defendant
anesthesiologist had a serious history of drug abuse and administering
anesthesia while high. The anesthesiologist mistakenly administered potent
drugs into the patient's vena cava, the major vessel that leads directly to
the heart. The patient died, and her father sued the hospital. The plaintiff
had no access to the hospitals' peer review documents, and he was unable
to prove the hospital's negligence in allowing the anesthesiologist to
continue to practice within its operating rooms. Fortuitously for the
plaintiff, the anesthesiologist documented his drug problem in
correspondence. Evidence showed that the hospital peer review committee
knew about the anesthesiologist's drug problem and did nothing.84 If peer
reviewers are not committed to quality, extending protections to them is
harmful, not desirable.
2. Extra-Legal Reasons for Not Reporting
Most of the controversy surrounding the reporting systems has been
about institutional and individual health care providers' fears of liability.
Even supposing that such fears can be adequately addressed by expansive
protections, other impediments to reporting must be considered before
implementation of a successful reporting system is possible. I group these
barriers into three categories: barriers caused by lack of awareness,
barriers due to lack of access, and cultural barriers.
a. Awareness Barriers
In order for a reporting system to work towards total quality
management, reporters must (1) know what kinds of incidents to report
and (2) know what to include in their reports. Frontline employees-those
at what James Reason calls the sharp end 85-are the best source of
82 Dollar, supra note 58, at 282.
83 Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Wrongful-Death Settlement Includes Unusual Peer-Review
Clause, TEX. LAW., July 21, 1997, at 4.
84 Id.; see also Richard Warren Mithoff & Janie L. Jordan, Proving the Impossible: Patient
Safety and the Peer Review Privilege, HEALTH L. NEWS, Mar. 2000, at 5, 7.
85 Frontline practitioners are at the "sharp end" and they commit "active failures."
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information on weaknesses and areas for improvement. Through their
reports about accidents and near misses, they can create a useful database
for expert analysis. In order for reporters to know when and what to report,
they must understand the general goals of quality improvement. Although
medical personnel are highly trained, their understanding of quality
improvement cannot be assumed since most medical schools and residency
programs do not offer training in quality assurance or quality
improvement.86 Most house officers are unfamiliar with the philosophy of
continuous quality improvement. During residency training, they rarely, if
ever, discuss organizational processes as a target for reducing error. If the
house staff does not understand the potential benefits of incident reporting,
they may regard it as a nuisance and "yet more paperwork., 88 For
example, staff may feel no need to report a "near miss" because they have
dealt effectively with the incident and dodged a bad outcome.89 According
to the continuous quality improvement philosophy, however, near misses
are as important a source of information as actual accidents because the
same latent processes can lead to either outcome. If staff understood and
believed in CQI, they might be more likely to invest the time to report near
misses and thereby help to avoid accidents that are "waiting to happen."
The following example of why nurses fail to report the most common
type of error, drug medication errors, 90 shows how reporters that are
unaware of the reporting system's rationale can devastate the system's
usefulness. A medication error occurs unless the right drug is given to the
right patient at the right dose through the right route at the right time.9'
Nevertheless, nurses often do not report specific drug errors because they
Regulators and administrators are at the "blunt end" and they are responsible for "latent failures."
Supra note 22 and accompanying text.
86 Saul Weingart, House Officer Education and Organizational Obstacles to Quality
Improvement, 22 JT. COMM'N J. QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 640, 642 (1996). Weingart includes a brief
discussion about the deficits in medical education with respect to quality assurance and improvement.
A 1990 survey of 98 medical school deans found that less than a third of respondents' medical schools
and residency programs offered any training on quality assurance. Id. Surveys of medical residents
have found that fewer than one-fifth expressed comfort with the basic principles of quality assurance
and only one-half agreed that quality assurance activities benefit physicians and are applicable to
health care. Id.
87 Id. at 643.
88 See Charles Vincent et al., Reasons for Not Reporting Adverse Incidents: An Empirical
Study, 5 J. EVAL. IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 13, 20 (1999).
89 Id. at 14.
90 See Kris Rebillot, Tackling Medication Errors Head On, in REDUCING MEDICAL ERRORS
AND IMPROVING PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 18, at 18. In Luther-Midelfort Hospital, Roger Resar
conducted a year-long study of charts and procedures to assess drug errors. He found 200-230 actual or
potential errors for every 100 patient charts.
91 This "five rights" definition is traditional. Patti Ludwig-Beymer, The Effect of Testing on
the Reported Incidence of Medication Errors in a Medical Center, 21 J. CONTINUING EDUC. IN
NURSING 11, 12 (1990). Recently, some have advocated expanding the definition to include
administrations of medications to patients with known allergies to said medication (for example,
penicillin). Id.
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view them as "non-errors" in their clinical judgment.92 In Osborne's study
about nurses' reporting habits with regard to medication error, respondents
split on the question of whether a patient's missing a nebulizer treatment
constituted a drug error. 93 This is surprising because a patient's missing a
treatment is an objective drug error. In addition, most respondents reported
that they would not consider it an error to administer an additional
Percocet pill upon a patient's request. Though the nurses believed that a
patient's continuing pain warranted administration of a second pill, the
nurse's second administration constitutes an objective drug error.
In addition to having a general understanding of quality improvement,
individual reporters should know about the particular reporting system.
First, they need to know that the reporting system exists. Second, they
need to know the types of incidents the reporting system collects. Third,
they need to know how to report an incident. This seems intuitive, but their
understanding of these matters cannot be taken for granted. A study of
physicians and nurse midwives of two obstetric units showed that while
most of the staff knew about the reporting system and 90% knew how to
report an incident, only 70% knew where to find a list of reportable
incidents.94
b. Access and Ease-of- Use Barriers
Any incident reporting system must be easy for the reporter to access
and to use. Health care providers are wary of demands on their time and
may be easily dissuaded from reporting if the reporting system is too
cumbersome. About one-third of the previously-mentioned study's
participants failed to report because the system increased work load.
Similarly, nearly one-third agreed that they did not report because they
were too busy and forgot.95
Technology can increase access and ease of the system. The reporting
system can use technologies that are already available and heavily used by
providers. For example, a 1993 study made use of the fact that house
officers actively used e-mail and the hospital had over 2000 e-mail
terminals dispersed throughout the hospital. The investigator encouraged
the officers to send incident reports via e-mail, which worked well.
92 Id.
93 Joan Osborne, Nurses' Perceptions, When Is It a Medication Error? 29 J. NURSING
ADMIN. 33, 36 (1999). The study was a comparative survey of full- and part-time RNs employed at a
700-bed community hospital. The investigator distributed surveys to all RNs involved in dispensing
medicine. Participation was voluntary and anonymous, and 62% of ninety-two nurses responded for a
total of fifty-seven responses. Id. at 35. Although the study's small size warns against generalization, it
gives qualitative information about what nurses may be thinking when they do not report errors.
94 Vincent et al., supra note 88, at 15.
95 Id. at 17. Note that this third of the staff is not necessarily the same third mentioned in the
text accompanying note 94.
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c. Cultural Barriers
Even supposing that legal disincentives to reporting have been
adequately addressed, medicine's traditionally hierarchical, perfectionist,
and less-than-candid culture does not lend itself to vigorous reporting.
96
Physicians do not acknowledge or discuss mistakes because of concerns
about personal reputation.97 Junior physicians hesitate to report blunders of
senior physicians98 who the juniors will ultimately ask to write
recommendations. Non-physicians are reluctant to convey physician
errors.99 Nurses do not acknowledge mistakes because they fear their nurse
manager's and coworkers' reactions.'00 Nurses pause before recounting
even minor mistakes of their colleagues, especially if the colleagues will
be disciplined.' 0'
A good reporting system requires that reporters be willing to report
detailed and potentially embarrassing information about errors. The IOM
report focuses on medical error and ushers in a cultural change about how
medicine perceives error. Policymakers, institutions, and health care
practitioners have begun to acknowledge that medical error is rampant and
that patient safety is an indispensable goal. As importantly, a movement
from blaming individuals towards blaming systems is occurring. The
venerable 1OM made an innovative leap when it embraced a systems
approach in its report. The centrality of this shift is manifest in the report's
carefully chosen title: To Err Is Human.
As we have seen, providers hesitate to report for legal and extra-legal
reasons. Legal barriers include providers' fears that any information they
furnish with the goal of improving quality may be used against them in the
tort system. Such fears are overblown, yet understandable, given the
current environment where the discoverability of quality improvement
reports is determined ex post. As importantly, providers fail to report for
extra-legal reasons, which include their ignorance about how to improve
safety and medicine's traditional culture of blame. This Note focuses on
how the legal system can encourage providers to take patient safety
seriously, and the next section outlines methods of diminishing legal
96 Andrea Gerlin, Hospital Mistakes Kill I of Every 200 Patients, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept.
19, 1999, at A20. "Beginning in medical school, the culture of medicine discourages acknowledging
mistakes, asking for assistance, exhibiting any weakness, or challenging a supervisor. In medicine's
carefully ordered hierarchy, admitting or point out a mistake is frowned upon." Id.
97 Sexton et al., supra note 60, at 747.
98 Albert W. Wu et al., Do House Officers Learn from Their Mistakes?, 265 JAMA 2089,
2092 (1991).
99 Cullen, supra note 60, at 547.
100 Jill Gladstone, Drug Administration Errors: A Study Into the Factors Underlying the
Occurrence and Reporting of Drug Errors in a District General Hospital, 22 J. ADVANCED NURSING
628 (1995); Osborne, supra note 93.
101 Rebillot, supra note 90, at 19.
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barriers.
IV. Recommendations and Current Proposals For Legal Barriers
Legislators should pass a bright-line rule protecting confidentiality of
incident reports made for the purposes of quality management. As has
been shown, practitioners are overly concerned about legal risks. °2
Legally, much will have to be done to assure them that incident reports are
and will remain confidential. This is especially true given the fact that the
most useful incident reports are those that contain details and conjectures
about causation.
10 3
Before delving into how a bright-line rule might look, this section
briefly addresses physicians' fears about the National Practitioner Data
Bank (NPDB).10 4 In 1986, Congress authorized the creation of the NPDB,
a national database containing information about physicians' malpractice
payments and any professional sanctions including adverse licensure and
hospital privileging actions.105 Hospitals must query the data bank about
new appointments and existing staff every two years, thereby addressing
the problem of interstate movement by physicians who have been
disciplined in their previous state.10 6 The data bank was never intended for
the public. Nevertheless, periodically, legislators and many public
advocacy groups discuss opening the data bank to the public.0 7 Such an
action would seriously undermine whatever faith physicians might have in
legal guarantees of confidentiality concerning incident reports.
A uniform, bright-line statute will allay practitioners' confusion about
what they can expect from the courts in terms of discoverability of incident
reports. As discussed earlier, courts currently make an ex post
determination about whether to allow discovery of a particular incident
report, based on the individual characteristics of that report's production.
Practitioners do not appreciate the nuances, and they respond by assuming
that reports are discoverable. This, in turn, reduces candor.
The Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987
(DOD Act) contains the kind of broad provision that should allay
providers' fears about litigation. The DOD Act, which applies to the
102 Kapp characterizes physicians' attitudes towards lawyers and the medical malpractice
system like this: "We are swimming in a pool of sharks." KAPP, OUR HANDS, supra note 61, at 6.
103 See supra pp. 12-13.
104 See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,101-11,152 (2000),
and regulations passed pursuant to the act. The regulations, which became effective on October 17,
1989, established the NPDB. 45 C.F.R. 60 (1994).
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Army's Quality Assurance program, explicitly ensures the confidentiality
of all quality assurance (QA) records and precludes QA participants from
testifying about the records or about any aspect of the QA proceedings or
conclusions.' °8 The statute's definition of QA records is expansive: QA
records are "the proceedings, records, minutes, and reports that emanate
from quality assurance program activities."' 0 9 A QA program is "any
activity carried out . . . to assess the quality of medical care."' 10 The
statute's definition of a QA program includes activities conducted by
individuals, committees, and other review bodies."' It is important to
recognize that Congress extended confidentiality to QA activities, but not
QA committees. The statute explicitly covers individuals as well as
committees. 1 2 As such, the statute covers incident reports filled out by
individuals. In protecting quality assurance activities, Congress did not
quash plaintiffs' access to information entirely. The statute specifically
says that information maintained outside the QA program-for example,
information in the medical record-will remain available for discovery,
even if that information is presented during QA activities. 
13
As with the DOD Act, IOM recommended that Congress extend peer
review protections to all quality improvement data that are collected by
health care organizations, whether the data is used internally or shared
with others for the purpose of enhancing patient safety.' 14 IOM's
recommendation is reflected in the Stop All Frequent Errors (SAFE) in
Medicare and Medicaid Act of 2000 (SAFE bill)." 5 The SAFE bill states
among its purposes the extension of "existing confidentiality and peer
review protections to the additional required reports of error under such
[reporting] systems that are developed for safety and quality improvement
purposes under the Medicare and Medicaid programs."".16 The bill
mandates that institutional providers provide incident reports (with health
care workers' and patients' names deleted) to designated state regulatory
agencies or national accreditation agencies. The state agencies are
prohibited from using the information against the provider in its survey or
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112 Id.; see also Woodruff, supra note 108, at 7 (emphasizing the breadth of the federal
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certification processes. 17 Rather than trust institutions to control quality
from within closed doors, this mandatory reporting helps to ensure that
institutions are putting some resources into patient safety. Under the bill,
institutional providers are punished for not reporting; if the institutional
provider does not report adequately for more than two years, the
institution's failure to comply with the law will become public
information.
The bill attempts to minimize individual reporters' fears about
liability by stipulating that institutions submit reports without individuals'
names."8 This approach puts the pressure on the institution to encourage
its practitioners to report. Whether this is the correct pressure point is
currently unknown. In order to quell any residual fears that the incident
may be distinctive enough to reveal the identity of the health care provider,
the Act explicitly extends confidentiality to quality improvement
documents. The Act supersedes any conflicting laws (for example, state
laws)" 9 and defines the protected documents expansively to include data,
reports, records, memoranda, analyses, statements, and other
communications 20 developed by or on behalf of a provider of services
with respect to quality improvement.
Conclusion
Safer medical care is an imperative social goal that can be achieved
through a variety of institutional mechanisms. Establishing a workable
reporting system is the first step in discovering the contours of the medical
error crisis. Whether the system is mandatory or voluntary is not as
important as (1) assuring reporters that incident reports will not be used
against them in litigation and (2) removing non-legal disincentives, such as
access and cultural barriers to reporting. The legal system can alleviate the
first factor by protecting consistently the information contained in incident
reports. Currently, hospital incident reports for the purposes of quality
control are discoverable in most states. Protecting such reports should
encourage candid reporting and result in improved quality. If regulatory
agencies reviewed the incident reports and the institution's response, the
risk of inadequate institutional responses would be minimized. The legal
system's treatment of incident reports in conjunction with a well
developed reporting system and the current paradigm shift towards
117 Id. § 3(g)(1).
118 Id. § 3(e)(3)(B).
119 This portion of the Act is crucial because some states' peer review protections do not
extend to incident reports. By contrast, Senators Specter, Harkin, and Inouye introduced a bill that
provides for confidentiality, but the bill's section on confidentiality is not to supersede any state law.
Medical Error Reduction Act of 2000, S. 2038, 106th Cong. § 922(c)(2) (2000).
120 Id. §§ 923-924.
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systems analysis should reduce non-legal disincentives to reporting.
